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IN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE 4th JUDICiAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Estate 
a broker, John Runkle, 
broker, 
the Idaho 
JUDiCiAL REVIEW- 1 
worked 
00005 
it made a 
00006 
IS requesting the of all that 
has have 






under facts, Petitioner violated Idaho Code 
through a broker 
IS crux of 
consistently failed to understand or a 
property is not an 
facts, Petitioner violated 
course of and 
under 
that 
UUI'<vC; a transcript 
available 
or due process principles~ 
presented 
not address or acknowledge 
its by 
did not even have Its 
REViEW-4 
00008 
the use of a private attorney was appropriate 
who now seeks have Petitioner liable 
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLA¥, 
PETITIONER 
N. 
the above entitled lJc.flt.nn 
Petition for Judicial Review are true and correct to the best 
of 2009. 
to me this ..1-.-__ 
JUDICIAL REVIEW-
00009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, 
Petitioner, Case No. CVOC0907296 
vs. 




Petition for Judicial Review having been filed herein, and it appearing that the 
issues presented on appeal are questions of law and fact; and it further appearing that a 
record/transcript is necessary to process this appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That upon completion of the record the agency shall mail or deliver a notice of 
lodging of transcript and record to all attorneys of record or parties appearing in person 
and to the district court. 
2) That the notice shall inform the parties before the agency that they pick up a 
copy of the transcript and record at the agency and that the parties have fourteen (14) 
days from the date of the mailing of the notice in which to file with the agency any 
objections, and the notice will further advise the petitioner to pay the balance of the fees 
for preparation before the transcript and record will be delivered to the petitioner. 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 1 
00010 
3) That the Agency shall transmit the settled transcript and record to the district 
court within forty-two (42) days of the service of the petition for judicial review. 
4) That the Agency, upon filing with the Court the record, shall send notice of 
such filing to all parties; 
5) That the Petitioner's brief shall be filed and served within thirty-five (35) days of 
the date the transcript and record are filed with the Court. 
6) That the Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eight (28) 
days after service of Petitioner's brief. 
7) That Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twenty-one 
(21) days after service of Respondent's brief. 
8) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument after all briefs are 
filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so 
notice for oral argument, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case 
on the briefs and the record. 
Dated this 28th day of April, 2009. 
KATHRYN STICKLEN 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 2 00011 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of April, 2009, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR 
NAYLOR & HALES, PC 
950 W BANNOCK, STE 610 
BOISE, ID 83702 
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY 
PETITIONER (PROSE) 
3304 N. PARK ROAD 
SPOKANE VALLEY, WA 99212 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
(~~' .', I r 
\ \ i\,J n0jt/ // By: j\i'~~\ / 
\ ' t, 
Beputy Court Cler< 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 3 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street. Ste. 610 
Boise. lD 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV -OC-2009-07296 
REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Respondent, by and through its attorneys of record. Naylor & Hales. P.c.. gives notice 
to the Court that eertain documents filed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of Washington (In Re Michael Scott lvlaclay, Case No. 09-02717-PCW). related to 
Petitioner's pleadings for a finding of indigency are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B." 
Respondent requests the Court take judicial notice of these court filings, and in consideration of the 
fact that Petitioner's bankruptcy has been dismissed, reconsider this Court's finding of indigency. 
Should the Petitioner fail to no\\" pay the Court reporting fees for the transcript lodged 
with the Agency. Respondent requests that this Court dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review for 
REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1. 
00013 
failure to prosecute pursuant to l.R.C.P. 84(n). Rule 84~n) provides that when a party fails to timely 
take any step in the proceedings, it may be grounds for a sanction, including a dismissal of the 
petition for judicial review. 
No oral argument is requested. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of October. 2009. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c. 
By ________ ~----____ ------------------
Kirtlan G. Naylor, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of October. 2009, I caused to be served. by 
the method(s) indicated. a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Michael S. Maclay 
3304 N. Park Road 
Spokane Valley, W A 99212 
Petitioner 






Hand Delivered Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Real Estate Commission 




P.O. Box 83720 334-2050 
Boise, 10 83720-0077 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
M:\IRFc\Mada). rvllchad 'Scolt'\Judiciul Review Casel7449 _ 05 Report on BK. Motion to Dismiss ['dillon liJI JudiCIal Rc\ Icw.\\pd 
REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY AND MOTION TO DISMISS 




Michael Scott Maclay 
36 Filed 09/30109 Entered 09/3 14:55:34 Pg 1 of 1 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 
Case Number 09-02717-PCW 
Chapter 13 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Debtor( s ) 
THJS MATTER came on for hearing before the Honorable Patricia C. Williams on September 29, 2009 on 
the confirmation of the Chapter 13 Plan. Debtor's counsel made an Oral Motion to Dismiss the Chapter 13 
Case. The Court reviewed the files and records herein, and was fully advised in the premises. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
I. The debtor's counsel, Elizabeth Heath, made an oral Motion to Dismiss the case. 
2 . The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the above-referenced Chapter 13 case is hereby DISMISSED. 
ORDER OF DlSi\IISSAL 
U" . 11~71 : . I . ... . I J • .!.PC\\ nl"l.1o:l" "Ihlll< ~ . I . I'! 5..1~t.J:!lil . h ITGJ..I I:: 
~(lk/~ 
09/30/2009 11: 3 2:47 




09-02717 -PCVV13 0 Filed 09/30/09 Entered 09/3 "'9 14:55:34 Pg 1 of 1 
In re: 
Michael Scott Maclay 
(Debtor) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 
Case Number: 09-02717-PCW13 
Chapter: 13 
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL 
Form ntcdsm 
Rev 06/22/2009 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an Order Dismissing the above-entitled case was signed on September 
30,2009 and entered on the case docket on September 30,2009. 
Date: September 30, 2009 CLERK OF COURT 
































ichael Scott Maclay 
etitioner (Pro Se) 
304 N. Park Road 
pokane Valley, WA 99212 
509) 714-7974 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Michael Scott Maclay, 
Case No. CVOC0907296 
Petitioner 
vs. PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Idaho Real Estate Commission, 
Res ondent 
Petitioner, MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, presents the following memorandum 0 
oints and authorities in support of his Petition for Judicial Review. Petitioner als 
equests that a date and time be set by this Court for oral arguments on thi 
atter. 
INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Hundreds of years ago, the term "witch hunt" arose from the Salem Witch Trial 
o describe an overzealous pursuit of a perceived wrongdoer, with a frequent and fairl 
IIous disregard for facts supporting a person's innocence. In the 1950's, during th 
cCarthy era, many lives were ruined on accusations alone. Sadly. it is human natur 
o draw inferences from an initial "perception" of facts, and then, once conclusions ar 
eached, the search becomes one of focusing on those facts that support the conclusio 
nd conveniently ignoring those that do not. We have all been victims of this kind 0 
ersecution at one time or another in our lives. Our legal system is supposed t 
etitiouer's Brief Supporting judicial Review - 1 
00017 



























nvestigate and consider facts dispassionately. Rather than duels and other "tit for tat' 
eans of resolving disputes, we turn to impartial tribunals to settle differences. Wit 
ope and optimism, Petitioner looks to this Court to finally and fully review the agenc 
ecord-including Petitioner's testimony in his deposition and at the hearing, as well a 
etitioners exhibits, (Marked in the Agency Record as A-G). If all the evidence is take 
nto consideration, it will be clear that Petitioner was at all times acting in good faith wi 
determined effort to abide by the rules-no matter how gray some of them are---an 
o provide a valuable and desired marketing service to Idaho citizens. There certainly i 
o pattern of misconduct, dishonesty, recklessness, or deceit. Petitioner came to Idaho, 
anting to use the same marketing program that he had been using for years i 
ashington. He was open and upfront about this, and initially his broker. John Runkle, 
as in agreement. Mr. Runkle's name as broker, and his signature, appears on virtuall 
very Seller's Representation Agreement that contained a flat fee for marketin 
rrangement. Mr. Runkle even sent his Idaho agents to Washington to work for the rea 
state company, Family First, that also employed Petitioner. Jerry Webb, the Famil 
irst Broker, clearly states this in his letter to the Idaho Real Estate Commission, 
"Commission~), (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Curiously, the Commission chose not t 
ursue a deposition or any other means of verifying Mr. Webb's letter. 
It is fair to say that ~but for" the so called verified complaint of John Runkle an 
is struggle with Petitioner's flat fee marketing program, the Commission would no 
ave pursued its case with such intensity. The Administrative Hearing Officer did no 
ive any weight to Mr. Webb's letter, or the letter of attorney and Idaho broker, Georg 
ucera (Petitioner's Exhibit "A), or the inconSistency of Mr. Runkle's statement that h 
id not learn of the flat fee marketing program until September of 2006, when the fact 
learly show that he, or his authorized representative, Steve Ayles, was signing th 
eller Representation Agreements that included up front flat fee marketing fees a 
roker, (See Respondent's Exhibits 4, 5, and 6). Only the Smith Seller Representatio 
greement, (Respondent's Exhibit 3) was not signed by Mr. Runkle. The Smit 
greement was executed through Real Team in Washington and there is no eviden 
hat Petitioner received any marketing fee from this Agreement Petitioner was no 
nvolved with this Agreement. The Agreements shown as Exhibits 4,5, and 6, were al 
etitioner's Brief Supporting Judicial Review - 2 
00018 



























ntered into prior to September of 2006. So how could Mr. Runkle honestly say he di 
ot know about Petitioner's upfront flat fee marketing program before then? Doesn' 
his weaken Mr. Runkle's credibility? Yet, incredibly, the Hearing Officer failed t 
ddress these facts in her Findings of Fact. If a person considers something but the 
hooses to disregard it in reaching a conclusion, would not logic dictate that he or she a 
east address the question of why these facts were not persuasive? 
In his deposition, Mr. Runkle, (pgs 25-29 of Runkle's deposition) essentially say 
hat he does not know what he was signing, when answering the question of whether h 
new about the upfront marketing fees charged by Petitioner before September 2006. 
hat kind of responsible broker would admit that he just signed whatever crossed hi 
In his letter to Scott Maclay dated March 1, 2006, (Petitioner's Exhibit A), Idah 
raker and attorney, George Kucera, gives a sensible definition and distinction betwee 
arketing fees that are not related to the perfonnance of any act requiring a real estat 
icense in the State of Idaho and the "completion" of acts requiring a real estate license. 
ere you have a broker who is perfectly willing, as many brokers in Washington are an 
ere, to allow an agent to charge a marketing fee for non real estate agent acts withou 
nning this fee through the brokerage. Simply noting the fee on the Listing Agreemen 
as acceptable to this Idaho broker. Even Mr. Morse, the Commission's investigato 
ays that there is a gray area (Transcript pages 119-120) between up front marketin 
ees paid to the agent who is providing the marketing and then further real estat 
icensee acts the compensation for which must go through the brokerage. When yo 
ave a gray area of the law, and particularly when you have confusion amongst broker 
ith one accepting it and one not accepting it, and you have a practice that has bee 
uccessfully doing it in another state for many years, and when you are up front an 
pen about it, how can an unbiased evaluator of facts conclude that Petitioner wa 
cting recklessly or engaging in a pattern of deceit and misconduct? 
Petitioner tried to point out these relevant facts and grayness of the law both a 
he Administrative Hearing (see Transcript of Petitioners opening statement an 
eritioner's Brief Supporting Judicial Review - 3 
000l~) 
























xhibits) and through his retained counsel's Memorandum in Support of a Motion fo 
econsideration ( Item #7 on the Index of Agency Record), yet without addressing an 
pecifies, the Hearing Officer simply states "all arguments set forth in the Memorandu 
ere already considered in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law an 
ecommended Order." (Item 9 of Agency Record, pg.1). A careful review of th 
indings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order shows that the Hearin 
Icer failed to address specifically any of Petitioner's exhibits including the letter fro 
eorge Kucera, the inconsistency between Jerry Webb's letter (Respondent's Exhib' 
), the facts showing Mr. Runkle's awareness and approval of the upfront marketin 
ees being paid directly to Petitioner prior to September 2006. 
In its Final Order, the Commission adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings in thei 
ntirety. Petitioner intends to address the other conclusions by the Hearing Office 
e~ow, but it is critical to a fair review of this case, that the Hearing Officer's glarin 
mission of the facts supporting Petitioner's good faith activities related to the marketin 
ees be corrected. At a minimum this case should be remanded with instructions to th 
earing Officer to state why she was not troubled by Mr. Runkle's signature on th 
isting Agreements, prior to September 2006, or why she gave no probative value to th 
etters of Jerry Webb and/or George Kucera concerning the issue of the upfron 
arketing fees paid to Petitioner. 
It is also a regrettable and curious omission for the Hearing Officer to fail t 
ddress the exhibits presented by Petitioner of his correspondence with Help-U-Sel 
Petitioners Exhibits B, E, and F) following the death of George Kucera in which h 
elieved that he was waiting for Help-U-Sell to transfer the Idaho franchise to him 
uring the period in question, October 31, 2007 through December of 2007, it appear 
hat at least one individual in Help-U-SeUs Corporate office, Erik Mower, was dealin 
itf') Petitioner on the level of telling him to be patient because "some files tha 
n1'ortunately were not transferred over to us". Certainly, it shows that Petitioner wa 
eing led, in good faith, to believe that the transfer of the Help-U-Sell franchise in Idah 
rom George Kucera was "in the works". 































FLAT FEE MARKETING FEES ARE NOT REQUIRED 
TO BE PAID THROUGH THE REAL ESTATE BROKER 
As stated in the Introduction, this is the crux of this whole case. Is John Runkl 
ny different than George Kucera in terms of their status as Brokers in the State 0 
daho_ One Broker concludes that marketing fees must be paid through his firm and 0 
he other does not. Both brokers, as well as Petitioner, agree that the marketing fee 
hould be, and in this case, were disclosed to the Sellers on the Listing Agreement 
ithout giving regard to George Kucera's letter, John Runkle's tacit consent of the fee 
s evidenced by his signature on four of the five listing agreements, or even to th 
estimony of Don Morse-the Commission's own investigator-that this is a gray area 0 
he law, the Hearing Officer erred in concluding on page 17 of the Findings of Fact 
onclusions of Law, and Recommended Order (#2 of Agency Record) that Petitione 
ad violated Idaho Code Section 54-2054 (9). Petitioner accepted a marketing fee, wit 
he consent of his broker, John Runkle. Any other services as a real estate agent fo 
he clients involved were to be paid-upon completion of a sale-by a commission tha 
ould have been paid through the brokerage. In addition. arguably, the marketing fe 
as paid through the brokerage (as Mr. Kucera suggests in his letter) with the simpl 
act that the broker had knowledge of the fee and it was disclosed in the Listin 
greement. Instead of a violation of Idaho Real Estate law, really what you have her 
s a difference of opinion between a broker and his agent Yes, the relationshi 
robably needed to be severed, but it is a significant, unsupported stretch to go fro 
here to a conclusion that the agent is violating Idaho real estate law and "engaging in 
ntinued or flagrant course of misrepresentation or making false promises, .. an 
ngaging in dishonest or dishonorable dealings, reckless conduct, etc. as the Hearin 
fficer concludes. (Findings, pg 17). 
Idaho Code 54-2054(9) is limited to fees for the "performance of any act 
equiring a real estate license. No one suggests that only a person with a real estat 
icense can "market" real property. Access to a multiple listing service is not somethin 
hat by statute requires a real estate license, Instead, it is a rule engineered by broker 
o establish and maintain a monopoly on who gets to broadly advertise homes for sale. 
etitioner's BricfSupporti.IJg Judicial Review - 5 
00021 



























ccess to a multiple listing service is limited to agents by the brokers who own th 
ervice, not by the law of the State of Idaho that governs real estate agents. I 
etitioner wants to help citizens of the State of Idaho who do not want to pay what the 
erceive are exorbitant commissions by using his status as an agent to get them acces 
o the multiple listing, then he is really doing nothing more than opening a marketin 
oor to them that an exclusive club had previously kept closed. Think about it, there i 
o salesmanship involved in entering data into a computer so that a home may b 
arketed. It is no different than advertising in a newspaper or at the comer convenien 
tore. Sellers recognize that greater exposure leads to more interest, and a multipl 
isting service obviously generally generates more notice of the sale than does a sign 0 
he property. Realtor fees are customarily not paid until and unless there is 
ompletion of a sale (a closing), and then they are paid for the services that a realto 
rovided in bringing a buyer and seller together. It is the art of negotiating and the wor 
f follow through, with lenders, other agents, loan payoffs, etc, that makes up th 
essence of what a realtor does and how he or she can justify a commission based fee. 
imply posting notice that a property is for sale-again whether through a sign in th 
ard, an advertisement in the paper, or a description in a multiple listing servi 
equires no special skill or training and thus is not something that does or should requir 
real estate license. To wrongly apply the law governing fees for acts that do, by la 
equire a real estate license, to a marketing program that is designed to help Idah 
itizens keep the cost of selling their homes as low as possible essentially denies 
hoice to Idaho residents who are willing to accept greater responsibility for selling thei 
As for the other conclusions regarding conduct not involving a flat fee marketin 
rogram, Petitioner has had counsel prepare briefs (Brief in Support of Motion fo 
aking Exception to Recommended Order--Item 14 on the Index of Agency Record, an 
emorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration-Item 8 on the Index of Agenc 
ecord) that were carefully prepared and presented an alternate picture of a parsa 
ho substantially complied with Idaho Real Estate Law while at the same time tried t 
aintain a business following the death of its broker and earnestly worked with the bot 
he Idaho Real Estate Commission and the national headquarters of Help-U-Sell t 
etitioner's Brief Supporting Judicial Review - 6 
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acilitate a transfer of ownership of a franchise for a very short period of time (Octobe 
1, 2007 to December 5, 2007~just over a month). During that time there were t\N 
isting for two properties for one person, Aaron Krivor, in which a listing agreement wa 
xecuted not by Petitioner at the end of October 2007 and then activated in earl 
ecember. There simply is no evidence that Petitioner took any action with regard t 
his one customer between October 31 j 2007, the end of his association with Georg 
ucera and December 5, 2009, when his association with Treaty Rock began. Give 
hese facts, which were startlingly ignored by the Hearing Officer and the Commission i 
s Final Order. Most significant is the fact that Petitioner's signature does not appea 
n either the listing agreements for Aaron Krivor. 
Like in a witch hunt, facts that do not support a pre~conceived conclusion ar 
imply ignored. Another example of this is the findings and conclusions reached wit 
egard to the Treaty Rock Realty Listings Advertised on the Help-U-8ell Website. 
reaty Rock's broker, Kirby Swanson, only became alarmed about any so called eros 
arketing after Don Morse-the Commission's investigator told her that he believed th 
ascription of Treaty Rock listings on the Help-U-Sell website were improper. (Kirb 
wanson Deposition pg. 17-part of Item 0 in the Index of Agency Record). H 
asically threatened Ms. Swanson into taking action that she might not otherwise hav 
aken. The Help-U-Sell website was for Petitioner's Washington franchise and th 
escriptions are not misleading in that Treaty Rock is used for the Idaho listings. Bot 
istings just happen to be on a website that Petitioner used for both Washington an 
daho. Respondent acknowledges, in its brief titled "Petitioner's Support of the Finding 
f Fact and Conclusions of law" on page 4 (Item 11 on the Index of Agency Record 
hat the concept of cross marketing properties may be utilized, but supports this with 
tatement that has no legal backing "this occurs only where the brokerages are license 
n Idaho..... Here you have a situation where one brokerage was properly identified a 
eing licensed in Washington (Help-U-Sell) and one in Idaho (Treaty Rock) 
ssentially, this kind of advertising is to let people know that a person has two differen 
ssociations and listings, one in Washington and one in Idaho. It is not anymor 
isleading to the public, than cross marketing is in general. Certainly, alone, it does no 
ive rise to a revocation of a real estate license. In fact none of this does. 
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The Hearing Officer takes a few isolated facts to support her Conclusions an 
ankly ignores verifiable facts that lead to a different conclusion. At a minimum, thi 
ase should be remanded with instructions for the Hearing Officer and the Commissio 
o address the facts and law supporting Petitioner. By address, Petitioner means stat 
hy they are or are not important in arriving at the conclusions drawn. The impartia 
bserver would very much wonder why John Runkle would complain about an act tha 
e gave tacit endorsement of by signing his name to the listing Agreements. Th 
mpartial observer (Idaho citizen) would wonder why he or she cannot pay a flat fee to 
ealtor to help market the sale of his or her property, without being required to accep 
he full menu of agent services. An Idaho citizen should have the right to participate a 
uch or as little as he or she wants in the sale of his or her home. With flat fe 
arketing, a home seller gets exposure to the market, but still retains the authority an 
bility to handle the negotiation of the sale of his or her own home. Idaho real estat 
aw requiring an agent to be paid through his or her broker is limited to compensatio 
amed for services that require a real estate agent license. Advertising a home for sal 
oes not require a real estate license. If this position is accepted by this Court. then th 
issionary zeal of the Commission in its effort to string together innuendo and non 
elated, non~reoccurring facts about the character and behavior of Petitioner t 
'cleanse" Idaho real estate of a so called "bad" seed reveals itself for the false front tha 
t truly is. The Commission has undertaken a mountainous effort just to be "right 
neluding the almost unfathomable amount of attorney fees and costs it has tolerated. 
'Much to do about nothing" is a very appropriate and fitting ending. Please break t 
pell that has kept everyone unfairly and irrationally focused on persecuting Petitioner 
Respectfully submitted this ..a day of November 2009. 
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PETITIONER 
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Spokane Valley, WA 99212 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB 1\0. 3569J 
NA YLOR & HALES. P.c. 
Attorneys at La\\ 
95() \V. Bannock Street. Ste. 610 
BOise. ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT l\lACLA Y. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION. 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV -OC-2009-07296 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Respondent Idaho Real Estate Commission. by and through its attorneys (If recorJ. 
Naylor & Hales. P.c.. moves this Court. pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8 .. +(n) and (0). for its order striking 
Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review and dismissing this matter. 
This Court, in its Order Governing Judicial Review tiled April 28. 2009. ordered that 
"The Petitioner's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date the transcript and record 
are filed with the Court." The Notice of Lodging of Agency Record-Proceedings Not Transcribed 
\vas tiled with the Court on May 7. 2009. and the Notice of Lodging ofTranseript \\as tiled with the 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1. 
00025 
Cnun un October 7.2009. Therefore. pursuant to the Court's order. and using the latest tiling date 
of tbe lodging of documents. 35 days ti'om October 7. 2009. \vould he Nowmber 12. 2009.! 
Given the fact that Petitioner's Brief in Suppurt of Petition for Judicial Revie\\ \\as 
filed on November 13.2009. the brief is untimely and must he stricken and the case dismissed. The 
Court's order is mandatory. and relies on the filing date \\ith the Court. not sen ice date to the parties. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(n). the failure ofa pany to timely take any steps in the process 
forjudicial review. while not deemedjurisdictional. may be grounds for appropriate sanctions. \\hich 
may include dismissal of a petition for judicial review. 
No request for additional time was received prior to the deadline. and \\hile Petitioner 
is acting as pro se counsel. pro se litigants are held to all standards of attorneys. King \' .It iyeh. l)l4 
I·.2d 565.567 (9th Cir. 1(87) (pro se litigants are hcld to the same procedural rules as counseled 
litigants). 
Therefore. it is respectfully submitted that Petitioner's case hefore this Court on 
administrati\l~ review by the District COLIrt be dismissed. No oral argumcnt is requested. 
Respectfully submitted this day of Nowmber, 2009. 
~-"-.-
NA YLOR & HALES. P.c. 
By -+-+_ 
'The 35th day was actually November 1 L 2009; hO\vevcr, pursuant to Rule 6. l.R.C.P .. 
since that date was Veterans Day. a legal holiday. the deadline falls to the next court date. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
~~-
served. by the method(s) indicated, a true and "",""'0.0T 
Michael S. Maclay 
3304 N. Park Road 
Spokane Valley, WA 99212 
Petitioner 
Kimberly A. Coster 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Real Estate Commission 
633 N. 4th Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise. 10 83720-0077 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOCRTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-OC0907296 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
This case came before the COUl1 on Respondent Idaho Real Estate Commission's (the 
Commission's) motions to dismiss and motion to stay. The Court, having determined that no 
hearing IS necessary, will deny the motion to dismiss and grant the motion to stay. 
1. Motion to Dismiss 
The Commission asserts that this judicial review should be dismissed with prejudice because 
the Petitioner's opening brief was filed one day late. The Commission relies on Rule 8 .. 1-(n), I.R.C.P. 
The Petitioner, Michael Scott MaClay (MaClay) objects to the motion, citing Alw v. Idaho 
TransportatioJl Department, 145 Idaho 192, 177 P.3d 406 (Ct. App. 2(08). 
The Court, having reviewed AllO and having reviewed the procedural hIstory of tillS case, 
denies the motion to dismiss. Under Rule 84(n), the Court may impose a sanction up to and 
including dismissal with prejudice. However, there is a preference for decision on the merIts: 
dismissal is a drastic sanction for failure to comply with time limits. There is no prejudice shown to 
the Commission. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied. 


























') Motion to Stav 
Contemporaneous with the motion to dismiss, the Commission moved to stay the briefing 
schedule. It appears that MaClay has not objected to that motion: therefore, it will be granted. The 
Commission's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eight (28) days of service of this order. 
MaClay's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twenty-one (21) days of service of the 
Commission's brief. Either pmty may schedule the case for oral argument after all briefs are fileu. 
If neither party calls the clerk to schedule argument within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is 
filcu, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs anu the record. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ¢J(g'r~ day of January, 2010. 
























CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
L J. David NavalTo, the undersigned authority, do hereby cenify that I havc maikd, by 
Unitcd States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice 
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attomeys of record in this cause in cnvelopes 
addressed as follows: 
KIRTLAN G. NA YLOR 
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BOISE, ID 83701 
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330-l: N. PARK ROAD 
SPOKANE Y ALLEY WASHINGTON 99111 
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BOISE IDAHO 83710-0077 
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1. DA YID l\iA YARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, I<.laho 
ooo:~o 
Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c. 
Attorneys at Lavv 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION. 
Respondent. 
Case No. CY-OC-2009-07296 
RESPONDENT IDAHO REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION'S REPLY BRIEF TO 
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIE\V 
Respondent, Idaho Real Estate Commission, by and through its attorneys of record. 
Naylor & Hales, P.c., files this brief in SUppOlt of the Final Order issued by the Idaho Real Estate 
Commission ("Agency") on March 19,2009, wherein the Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLm. and 
Recommended Order ("Recommended Order") of the Hearing Ofticer was adopted. 
Standard of Review 
An agency's factual determination need only be based on substantial and compdcnt 
evidence-evidence defined by the Idaho Supreme COUlt as "evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Delllbom v. Slale, Indus. Special lilt/em. Fund. 129 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1. 
oooa1 
Idaho 579, 582 (1997). This standard is "more than a scintilla of prooC but less than a 
preponderance." l\;faller a/Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 164 (1996). "Substantial and competent evidence 
need not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to necessarily lead to a certain conclusion." Cowan v. 
Bd. 0/ Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 517 (2006). This standard holds true even though there is 
contlicting evidence in the record. SOlO v. Simp/Of, 126 Idaho, 536, 539 (1994). 
Idaho Code Section 67-5279 sets forth the statutory scope of revie\v for the court in 
reviewing an agency's decision: 
67-5279. SCOPE OF REVIEW -- TYPE OF RELIEF. (1) The court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(2) When the agency was not required by the provisions of 
this chapter or by other provisions of law to base its action 
exclusively on a record, the court shall affirm the agency action 
unless the COUl1 finds that the action was: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency: 
(c) made upon unlawtlll procedure; or 
(d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or 
in par1, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this 
chapter or by other provisions oflavv to issue an order, the court shall 
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency: 
(c) made upon unlaw1lll procedure: 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whok:: or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or 
in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) 
of this section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial 
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 2. 
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Analysis 
In the case before this Court on judicial review, the Court has the advantage of 
numerous pleadings and brieilngs occurring prior to and following the appointed rh:aring Officer's 
Recommended Order, and the Final Order of the Agency. 
In fact, Petitioner's Support for the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Ckrk 
Record 0011), and Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion for Taking Exception to 
Recommended Order filed January 22, 2009 (Clerk's Record 0025), sets forth signiticant responses 
to the arguments raised by Mr. Maclay both in the Agency proceeding below as well as in the District 
Court Petition for Review. The documents and the arguments set forth in the record below ckarl; 
support the standard for judicial review that the eonclusions by the Hearing Otlicer and the Idaho 
Real Estate Commission are supported by the evidence such that a reasonable mind could accept and 
support those eonclusions. 
Before addressing any specific objections raised in the Petition for Judicial Re\ k~\\. 
it is important to note up front what is absent from the Petition for Judicial Review. Petitioner has 
not raised any allegation that the agency aetion was in violation of constitutional or statutory 
provisions; in excess of the statutory authority of the Agency; made upon unlawful procedure: or 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion as required by Idaho Code Section 67-5'279. Further. 
Petitioner has failed to raise any reasonable argument that the Agency action prejudiced the 
substantial rights ofthe appellant. Id. Therefore, the Petition for Judicial Review before this Court 
must be dismissed, and the Agency's Final Order must be affirmed. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 3. 
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Petitioner's Substantive Argument l 
Much of Petitioner's Brief asserts that the Hearing OHicer failed to give any weight 
to Petitioner's evidence; however, the Hearing Officer is not required to identify and address c\ ery 
piece of evidence and every testimony raised by the licensee, and declare that evidence not credible. 
Rather, the statutory standard for review on a petition for judicial revie'w is to determine \\hether 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
This standard holds true even though there is contlicting evidence in the record. 5;010 v. Simp/of, J 26 
Idaho 536, 539 (1994). 
There \vas sufficient evidence in the record by John Runkle in his deposition 
testimony where he admitted that certain documents may have been signed by his authorized agent 
with listing agreements referencing flat fees involving Mr. Maclay, but Mr. Runkle explained that 
no nat fee was ever paid through the brokerage to Mr. Maclay pursuant to those agreements. 
Therefore, even ifMr. Maclay had erroneously believed Mr. Runkle authorized him to engage in t1at 
ke agreements, the brokerage never was asked to, nor in fact did, pay Mr. :vlaclay any 11at fee 
payment through the brokerage. (Runkle Depo., pp. 25-29.) Mr. Runkle testified in his deposition 
that he, or his agent, Mr. Ayles, may have not comprehended the signi1icance of the seller 
representation agreements entered into by Mr. Maclay involving the 11 at kc arrangement. 
Nonetheless, the Hearing Otlicer properly found sufficient evidence to find the existence of the nat 
fee marketing program without paying money through the brokerage, and which failed to maintain 
I Respondent sees no purpose in responding to Petitioner's diatribe of an alleged "witch hunt" 
and the historical review of the Salem witch trials. Mr. Maclay was atTorded every due process 
afforded by the applicable rules and statutes governing the underlying proceeding, and exercised 
those rights by attending the administrative hearing, and filing numerous \vTitten objections and 
pleadings subsequent to the hearing related to the substantive issues raised by the hearing. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4. 
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the required documentation for the brokerage by his various listings. The Hearing Officer!s 
Recommended Order (pp. 4-9) recognized that Mr. Runkle and/or Mr. Ayles signed the seller 
representation agreements, and had sufIicient evidence from Mr. Runkle's explanation as to why the 
practice was still not authorized by the brokerage. There was no question that tailing to have these 
marketing fees paid through the brokerage was a violation of license law. 
Petitioner next argues that the t1at fee marketing fees are not required to be paid 
through the real estate broker. While it is true that simply advertising properties for sale, such as in 
a newspaper or on a for sale by owner website, are services not requiring a real estate liccnse, iv1r. 
Maclay's conduct as testified to by himself was not limited to simply advertising propaties. He 
accepted a fee for the performance of acts requiring a real estate license, including taking telephone 
calls in response to "for sale" signs, negotiating sales, providing comparative market analyses. taking 
pictures of the listing, placing yard signs, placing the listings on the multiple listing service (which 
requires a real estate license), and responding to contacts by interested buyers. (Maclay Depo., pp. 
35-37.) These acts all require a real estate license, and so any fees received in the performance of 
these acts must be paid through the broker. There \vas sufficient evidence for the Hearing Officer 
to make her Recommended Order, and upon which the Agency to adopt. 
Mr. Maclay argues that the Multiple Listings Service is nothing more than "an 
exclusive club" for the marketing of real estate, vvhich he did not believe should be kept closed. 
However, a requirement by the Multiple Listings Service is that partici pants be licensees in the stak 
of Idaho. Nonetheless, there was ample evidence to establish that Mr. Maclay did much more than 
simply list these properties. 
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Further, the only evidence in the record dealing with Eric Mower. from Help-U-SdL 
is Exhibits E and F to the hearing, and neither deal with Mr. Maclay's attempt to transfer the Hdp-U-
Sell franchise trom the deceased George Kucera to Mr. Maclay. However. there was clear evidence 
from Janet Ladd's hearing testimony (transcript, pp. 161-176), the Help-U-Sell representati\l~. 
indicating that she had communicated to Mr. Maclay \vhat was required for the transfer of a franchise 
following Mr. Kucera's death. At no time did she make the representation to Mr. Maclay that any 
transfer of the franchise had occurred and, in fact, he was served with letters to cease and desist from 
using the Help-U-Sell franchise information. 
Mr. Maclay continued to list Idaho properties on the Help-U-Sell website long atter 
Mr. Kucera's death in October, and even after December 5, 2007, when he \vas under the Treaty 
Rock Realty brokerage. The Krivor listing agreements were entered into on October 29,2007. at a 
time when Mr. Maclay was not under a proper Idaho broker. Mr. Kucera died in early October 2007. 
and neither Robbie Canfield nor Kirbi Swanson were his broker for the period of time October 29, 
2007 through December 29,2007, when Kirbi Swanson was the broker for Treaty Rock Realty it)r 
Mr. Maclay. Therefore, he acted without an Idaho licensed broker. 
Conclusion 
The Hearing Officer, and the Idaho Real Estate Commission ("Agency"), had 
sufticient substantial and competent evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion as to all claims and as to all Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted 
in the Recommended Order. The Petition for Judicial Review must be denied and the Final Order 
of the Agency must be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted thi day of February, 2010. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.e. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of February, :::W 1 0, I caused to be served. 
by the methodes) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Michael S. Maclay 
3304 N. Park Road 
Spokane Valley, W A 99212 
Pelitioner 
Kimberly A. Coster 
Idaho Real Estate Commission 
633 N. 4th Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0077 
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ichael Scott Maclay 
etitioner (Pro Se) 
304 N. Park Road 
pokane Valley, WA 99212 
509) 714-7974 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Michael Scott Maclay, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
Idaho Real Estate Commission, 
Res ondent 
Case No. CVOC0907296 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
Petitioner, MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, submits this reply to Respondent's Repl 
nef. Petitioner also, respectfully, requests a hearing in this matter. 
Respondent begins Its Reply Brief by minimizing the standard of review and i 
he process accentuates the lack of substantial facts to support the Final Order. 
Ithough a "preponderance of the evidence" may not be required, without its sensibl 
uidance, how can any fact be properly distinguished from opinion? "Evidence that 
easonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" is the same kind 0 
tandard that Joseph McCarthy used in the 1950's ... full of vague considerations an 
ipe for preconceived opinions to construct into prevailing facts. 
Petitioners intention in this pleading is to present the core key points to conside 
n evaluating this case that are clearly lacking in serving as a basis for revocation of hi 
icense. And, as Petitioner's livelihood and reputation are at stake, and he has bee 
ummeled by the Respondent in its effort to prevail, including; publishing th 
'cLilloner Rcply to Rcsponse Brief - 1 
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ommission's decision in the Agency's newspaper without any mention of an appeal 
while expending an incomprehensible amount of time and energy and money on wha 
s clearly a lack of procedures and policies as it relates to this case) is also wrong. 
Simple, substantial evidence exists in this record to completely suppo 
etitioner. Taking away a license to sell real estate in Idaho is clearly unwarranted an 
etaliatory for having the pure audacity to stand for what is clearly right, and minus an 
olicyor procedure from the commission to the contrary, and, hopefully, resulting in th 
est interests of the consumer and the entire community. At a minimum, this cas 
hould be remanded and the Hearings Officer ordered to give specific reasons as t 
hy the facts supporting Petitioner and his contention that flat fee marketing is legal ar 
ot, in and of themselves, "evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequat 
o support a conclusion the Petitioner was simply and openly navigating, with hi 
raker's knowledge and consent, through a very gray area of real estate law. Th 
earing Officer adopted Respondent's opinion that there was a pattern of misconduc 
arranting the severest sanction in license revocation without ever addressing a singl 
ctual fact supporting a contrary conclusion - none. This outcome is patently unfair an 
nderscores partiality. 
There is not just conflicting evidence in the record. Instead, there is a complete, 
rbitrary, and utter disregard for important facts that show that the responsible broker 
ohn Runkle, knew and tacitly approved of Petitioners flat fee marketing program 
unkle or his agent signed all of the listing agreements and the letter from Petitioner' 
ashington broker (a part of Respondent's exhibits) that credibly supports Petitioner' 
ontention that the very basis of his relationship with Runkle and my mission to brin 
his marketing program to Idaho. Additionally, in a clear abuse of discretion, th 
dministrative Hearing Officer failed to give any weight to the evidence, such as th 
arch 1, 2006, letter from attorney and real estate broker, George Kucera, stating tha 
lat fee marketing was not an act or service that required a real estate license or that th 
ees must go through a broker's account. Respondent's own investigator acknowledge 
hat this was a gray area-yet Petitioner is supposed to have his licensed revoked. 
etitioner performed other services as a real estate agent, for which he was required t 
elitioncr Reply to Response Brief - 2 
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e licensed (with any commission to paid through the broker for any act requiring 1 
icense without any violation or complaint), but it was clearly understood that the flat fe, 
as solely for marketing the property through the media such as on a website, I 
The whole scenario smells of arbitrariness and capriciousness. Petitioner ha 
een open and forthright about this practice from the very beginning and has, in fact, 
ontlnued to do so for nearly seventeen years. Instead of working with Petitioner t 
evelop more clear policies and procedures, Respondent overwhelmed Petitioner wit 
uestionable means and pre-ordained conclusions, just like McCarthy and his so calle 
ighteous crusaders. From the length of the investigation, to the time and money spen 
n investigators and attorneys, to the heavy handed way in which the investigator deal 
ith Kirby Swanson to the solicitation of complaints against Respondent, to the surrea 
nfair atmosphere of the Hearing where members of the Idaho Real Estate Commissio 
olemnly observed and participated like regal ultimate authorities posing as working i 
he public's best interests-how could Petitioner possibly have stood a fair chance. 
emember, the Commission is composed of realtors who have a vested profit interes 
n controlling access to the multiple listing service, 
A recap of the most salient and significant facts supporting Petitioner and hi 
ssertion that substantial evidence exists to show the Hearing Officer's decision wa 
rbitrary and capricious are as follows: 
I 
That it is understood that both John Runkle & Steve Ayles (ReaITeam) and Jerr 
ebb (Family First Real Estate Group) were working through Petitioner toward 
inalizing a merger of both companies while offering agents "flat affiliation fees" 
RealTeam) with the freedom to accept "flat marketing fees" (Family First Real Estat 
roup). In fact, both offices had crossed-licensed agents in both states through thei 
espective companies and for this exact purpose. It was only after Runkle and Web 
erminated their negotiations that Petitioner joined Kucera and HelpUSeli and for th 
urpose of carrying on the business, and offering this business model, followin 
ucera's terminal illness in both Idaho and Washington and expected death. Bot 
unkle and Webb had a viable motive in partiCipating in this "solicited" complaint fo 





























heir own economic benefit resulting in the removal of a viable competitor with prove 
esults superior to their own. This is the continuing basis of Petitioner's successful, third 
eneration business, which is perfectly legal in every state including; Idaho. 
The Commission continues to "paint" Petitioner as some rogue agent acting as 
roker without oversight. Runkle never issued any directive, nor has the Commissio 
roduced, or presented, any evidence Petitioner was ever instructed to do any thin 
ontrary to what Petitioner was doing. There is no Policy or Procedure in the RealTea 
peration Manual to the contrary (as would be required by the Commission Policy an 
rocedures Manual). Therefore, Runkle, as the responsible broker, is the only one wh 
iolated the Commission's requirements. Petitioner's compliance as a ~salesperson" 
auld not be optional to such a directive and it was simply never issued as it neve 
HelpUSell was, in fact, processing Petitioner's application for Kucera's franchis 
s planed prior to Kucera's death (evidenced by letters from HeJpUSel1 as contained i 
espondent's exhibits). HelpUSeH never demanded the State of Idaho or Washington t 
o anything to the contrary, and, in fact, recognized Petitioner as the Interim Broker an 
ater as the Responsible Broker in Washington without any objection. The fact tha 
ome an unknowing and unauthorized secretary responded to a "solicited" request b 
he Commission is suspect and probably inadmissible under the circumstances whil 
elpUSel! was in Chapter 7 and not able to process Petitioner's application. The fac 
etitioner was advertising Idaho listings (while w'lth Treaty Rock in Idaho) on hi 
ashington HelpUSeli website along with his Washington listings, and with the prope 
'disclosures" for each and every listing related to the respective state of ongln, i 
erfectly acceptable and proper--there remains nothing in the Commission's Policy an 
rocedures Manual to the contrary. It should be further noted that Petitioner did no 
ave access to Kucera's HelpUSell website immediately following his death .. , and tha 
he website was later granted to Petitioner when properly licensed. 
































It is clear that the commission is targeting a business model which is no 
orbldden in their policy and procedures manual written in the mid 1940's. Th 
ommission chose not to respond to Kucera or Runkle's inquiries. This activity is lega 
n Washington and each and every state neighboring state to Idaho, and in Idaho, s 
hy not for Petitioner? The other "solicited" complaints do not rise to the threshold 0 
evocation of license and are ~a lot to do about nothing." Any minor errors or omission 
s contained in the complaint are the responsibility of the responsible broker, Runkle, 
nd he alone is responsible for the Petitioner, the salesperson as outlined in th 
ommission's Policy and Procedures Manual. 
Petitioner has not endangered the public, committed any immoral act, converte 
unds or even worked outside of the instruction of the responsible broker. Both, Kucer 
nd Runkle, as the responsible brokers, made every reasonable attempt to satisfy th 
ommission's opinion of their own Rules and Procedures (or lack thereof), in advance, 
nd without any formal response from the Commission there is simply nothing in thei 
ules and Procedures Manual to consider (and it is inconceivable that th 
ommission's investigator, Mr. Morse, who only three months in the position as thei 
nvestigator, would state that he would have answered the question if asked and ha 
he authority to do so - and based on what non-existent policy or procedure?) Wh 
ouldn't Petitioner rely on the seasoned experience of George Kucera, a licensed rea 
state attorney and broker also licensed in virtually each and every western state. 
inus any other solution from the Commission, why wouldn't Petitioner rely on th 
olicies and procedures of other Commissions of neighboring states to Idaho (wher 
etitioner has also participated in establishing clear poliCies and procedures consisten 
o Petitioner's activities here in Idaho), specifically; in Washington where Petitioner ha 
een successfully operating offering flat marketing fees for nearly 17 years as a thir 
eneration real estate broker? There is no evidence from the Respondent that ther 
as any complaint, solicited or otherwise, that any fee or commission related to any ac 
equiring a real estate license for any closed sale for which Petitioner participated. Th 
act remains that fees for marketing are not subject to Commission oversight, and th 
crillOllcr Rcply to Response Brief - 5 
000(12 

























act that Petitioner was licensed should be considered a benefit, not a determent. Unde 
espondent's reasoning, newspapers and real estate magazines and all othe 
arketing companies of every nature, and their respective websites, should have 
esponsible broker, and require that everyone associated with their marketing compan 
e licensed. The Commission, therefore, had no justification for terminating Petitioner' 
usiness license for continuing to offer home marketing, and the end result is that th 
ommission is fixing "commissions" while "interfering with free trade" in attempting t 
ontrol consumer options. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hearing Officer and the Idaho Real Estate Commission had insufficien 
pinions that completely ignored evidence that a reasonable mind might accept a 
dequate to support a conclusion that Petitioner was not intentionally engaging in an 
ct that was improper, and certainly no act that warrants a revocation of Petitioner's rea 
state license. If, not for the flat fee marketing program.. we simply would not be her 
nd the light of objectivity clearly demonstrates that the Petitioner's actions do no 
arrant the recommended order handed down by a not so really independent hearin 
fficer ... which then became a final edict issued by Respondent. The McCarthy er 
hould not be revisited in this case and the record should be made straight in restorin 
etitioner's integrity, reputation and good business ethics that clearly benefit th 
onsumer and the entire community. 
Respectfully submitted this £. day of March 2010. 
&/~Lv/ k ~c1¥. 
MICHAEL SCO CL I 
PETITIONER 
3304 N. Park Road 
Spokane Valley, WA 99212 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
;'vllCHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No. CV -OC0907296 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 
Res ondent. 
This matter is before the Court on appeal from the Idaho Real Estate Commission's 
(Commission's) finding that Petitioner Michael Scott Maclay (Maclay) violated various provisions 
of Idaho Code Title 54, Chapter 20 and from its decision to revoke Maclay's Idaho real estate 
license and require Maclay to pay a civil fine of $5,000.00. Maclay argues that the facts do not 
support any finding of misconduct, dishonesty, recklessness, or deceit and that his actions do not 
provide a basis for the revocation of his real estate license. He asks the Court to revie\', the record 
and remand the case to the Commission to address the facts and law he presented. For the reasons 
set forth below, the Court affirms the Commission's decision. 
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Maclay began working as a licensed real estate sales agent in Idaho in 2000. He associated 
with eight brokers between 2000 and 2005, and then on March 10,2006, he became licensed with a 
broker named John Runkle (Runkle) at RealTeam Real Estate Center, Inc. (RealTeam). 
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1 
Just two days before Maclay began working with RealTeam, Mark Wanner and Juanita 
2 
Sanchez signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on which Maclay designated himself as 
3 the agent. The agreement does not contain a beginning or expiration date for the term of the 
4 agreement. Brokerage fees are provided for, but no additional fees such as a flat listing fee arc 
5 included. I Maclay did not sign the agreement, and neither did any other agent or broker. 
6 
After Maclay began working for RealTeam, Maclay an'anged for Idaho property owners to 
7 
pay an upfront marketing fee to either Maclay or RealTeam for property to be listed on the Multiple 
8 
Listing Service (MLS). Maclay accepted "flat fees from sellers who wanted flat fee access into the 
9 
10 
MLS as a marketing fee, only." However, these flat fees were generally noted on exclusive seller 
1 representation agreements as an additional fee to the brokerage fee. If a seller paid a flat fee of $295. 
Maday would visit the property, do a comparative market analysis, discuss pricing, discuss the 
13 option of having ads run in the newspaper and Craig's List, list the property on MLS, and place a 
14 
RealTeam sign in the yard with Maclay's phone number on it. If the seller procured a purchaser, the 
15 
seller would not pay the brokerage fee of 3%, but if Maclay procured a purchaser, the seller would 
16 
pay the brokerage fee. Accordingly, if a potential buyer called the phone number on the sign that 
17 
18 
Maday placed in the yard, Maclay would show the home and attempt to sell the property. 
19 Ken and Carolyn Jackson signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on March 2-4, 
20 2006 and paid the flat fee noted on the agreement to either Maclay or RealTeam. There is no price 
21 filled in on the Jacksons' agreement. Nevertheless, Maclay placed a RealTeam sign in the yard, 




I During Maday's deposition, he testified that he did not remember this agreement and that he did not remember 
26 whether Wanner paid a flat fee. There is no evidence in the record indicating that Wanner did in fact pay a nat fee. 



























Russ Rhuman signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on June 1, 2006 and paid 
Maclay, not RealTeam, the $295 MLS flat fee noted on the agreement. Maclay placed a RealTeam 
sign in the yard and listed Rhuman's property on MLS. 
Richard and Connie Matthiesen signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on July 
25, 2006 which provided that a $295 flat listing fee was to be paid to Maclay. Although Maclay 
does not remember receiving a payment from the Matthiesens, Maclay testified that it would have 
been consistent with his practice for the Matthiesens to pay him directly. 
Steve and Kerri Smith signed an exclusive seller representation agreement on September 26, 
2006 and later paid a $499 upfront marketing fee to Hotline Properties on October 13, 2006. 
Neither Maclay nor his broker signed the agreement. The agreement does not list a designated agent 
and does not contain beginning and expiration dates for the term of the agreement. Nevertheless, 
the Smith's property was listed on MLS through RealTeam, and Maclay was designated as the 
listing a member. Maclay acknowledges that at some point he became responsible for the Smith's 
MLS listing but he denies listing the property or being compensated for the representation. He 
claims that the paperwork for the Smiths' property was prepared by JelTy Webb (Webb) as a result 
of Webb's affiliation with Hotline Properties and not because of any request by Maclay. 
During 2006, Runkle had a couple of conversations with Maclay regarding Maclay's 
marketing strategy of charging an upfrom fee for listing property in MLS. Runkle told Maclay that 
he would only approve the use of an upfrom fee for limited services if the sellers signed an 
addendum acknowledging that they were receiving limited services for the upfront fcc. According 
to Runkle, he also told Maclay that before Maclay collected and kept upfrom fees, he needed to get 
a letter from the Commission saying that this type of acti vity is legal because Runkle did not believe 
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1 
that taking money without running it through the brokerage was permissible. Runkle did sign off on 
2 
some of the agreements. 
3 Following these conversations, Runkle received a phone call from a man named Aaron 
4 Klennert who stated that he paid an upfront marketing fee directly to Maclay. Runkle responded to 
5 this news by terminating Maclay's employment on October 30, 2006.2 After this termination, 
6 
Runkle received another phone call from a different person claiming that he paid an upfront 
7 
marketing fee directly to Maclay. Runkle subsequently filed a formal complaint with the 
8 
9 
Commission alleging that Maclay failed to turn in funds the broker, took payments directly from 
o clients, misrepresented the brokerage, and purposefully failed to turn in files to the brokerage. 
11 In January 2007, Maclay became licensed under a broker named George Kucera at Hclp-V-
12 Sell List 4 Less Realty (Help-V-Sell) in Idaho. Kucera was a licensed broker in both Washington 
13 and Idaho, and he owned a Help-V-Sell franchise that was licensed in both Washington and Idaho. 
4 
Apparently at some point Kucera wrote a letter approving a nat fee aITangement. 
15 
On October 8,2007, Kucera passed away. A qualified broker was not appointed to calTY on 
16 
the Help-V-Sale franchise business in Idaho, so the Idaho license for Kucera's Help-V-Sell was 
17 
18 
terminated on October 31,2007. As a result, Maclay lost his sales agent license with Help-U-Sell in 
19 Idaho. However, Maclay claims that Kucera left the franchise to him and that Maclay was 
20 appointed an interim broker for the Help-V-Sell in Washington. Maclay staI1ed working tmvards 
21 obtaining a broker's license in Idaho, but as of the hearing before the Commission on November 5, 
22 2008, Maclay had not yet obtained a broker's license. 
23 
24 
25 2 According (0 Maclay, he and Runkle talked about flat fees before Maclay even joined RealTeam. (Maclay Dep. 19::?-
of.) Maclay contends that Runkle terminated Maclay's employment after Runkle changed his mind about lelling him 
26 offer discounted listing programs with upfront marketing fees. 



























On October 29, 2007, Alann Krivor (KJivor) signed two exclusive seller representation 
agreements, one for each of two properties located in Idaho. The agreements listed a brokerage fee 
but no additional fees. John Dohm (Dohm), an agent working with Maclay, designated himself and 
Maclay as the agents and initialed that the term of the agreement commenced on November 26, 
2007. 
On November 28, 2007, Ktivor's properties were activated on MLS though Dohm and 
Maclay were not licensed under a broker and a broker had not yet accepted the agreement. In the 
MLS, Scott Maclay was named as the listing agent, and Treaty Rock Realty, Inc. (Treaty Rock) was 
named as the listing brokerage though the data sheets for these properties each list Help-U-Sell as 
the listing brokerage. Maclay is named as the listing agent in MLS, but he denies listing these 
properties. Maclay also denies having knowledge that any paperwork had been completed with 
respect to these properties until he later became licensed with Treaty Rock Reality, Inc. 
On December 5, 2007, Maclay became licensed under broker Kirbi Swanson (Swanson) 
with Treaty Rock. While Maclay was affiliated with Treaty Rock, Maclay only aJTanged one 
upfront marketing fee that Swanson was aware of, and this fee was paid to the brokerage. Yet even 
if Maclay only alTanged for one upfront marketing fees, Maclay nevertheless adveI1ised Idaho 
propel1ies listed with Treaty Rock, including the Krivor propel1ies, on Kucera's Help-L'-Scll 
website. He noted a general affiliation between Treaty Rock and Help-U-Sell on the website though 
there was no affiliation between the two companies recognized by the Commission, and he used the 
Treaty Rock logo on the website. 
DUling December 2007, Swanson asked Maclay to take the Treaty Rock logo and listings off 
the Help-U-Sell website, but as of January 11, 2008, the logo, the Krivor propelties, and other Idaho 
properties were still on that website. Some of the Idaho properties were listed for sale by owner as 



























FSBO, but some were not. Treaty Rock subsequently terminated Maclay's license on January 31, 
2008, and Maclay remained on inactive status until the Commission reviewed his case. 
In August 2008, the Staff of the Idaho Real Estate Commission filed a complaint against 
Maclay with the Commission. On November 5, 2008, the Commission and the designated hearing 
officer held a heating with respect to the complaint. On November 21, 2008, the hearing officer 
issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order; and on March 19,2009, 
the Commission adopted the recommended findings that Maclay violated Idaho Code ** 54-
2040(5); 54-2050(1)(a), (c); 54-2053(2), (4); 54-2054(9); 54-2060(2), (3), (11), (12); and 54-2065 
and 54-2002. The Commission then revoked Maclay's real estate license and ordered Maclay to pay 
a civil fine of $5,000. 
Maclay subsequently filed a timely petition for judicial review. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing an agency's decision, an appellate court may not "substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1). 
Instead, the court must defer "to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly enoneous." 
Price v. PayetTe COUlllY Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); 
Bennett v. State, 147 Idaho 141,142,206 P.3d 505,506 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Agency action must be affirmed on appeal unless the court determines that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory 




























provisions: (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure: (d) 
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious. or an 
abuse of discretion. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3); Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. The 
party attacking the agency's decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency cITed in a 
manner specified in section 67-6279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price, 131 
Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. 
Agencies are given the authority to make their own determinations of credibility and "to 
place greater or less weight on any particular piece of evidence according to its relative credibility." 
Morgan v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 6,8,813 P.2d 345, 347 (1991); see a/so 
Cooper v. Bd. of Profl Discipline, 134 Idaho 449, 457, 4 P.3d 561, 569 (2000). An appellate court 
may not "scrutinize the weight and credibility of the evidence relied upon," and it may not "overturn 
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence" even if there is conflicting 
evidence. SOlO v. Simplot, 126 Idaho 536, 539, 887 P.2d lO43, 1046 (1994) (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Maclay essentially asks this Court to review the record, weigh the evidence, and make its 
own findings of fact. He contends that if the Court reviews all the evidence in the record, the Court 
will find that Maclay acted "in good faith with a determined effort to abide by the rules." According 
to ~laclay, the hearing officer failed to address any of Maclay's exhibits and failed to consider any 
of the facts presented by Maclay. 
As noted above, the Court may not engage in the type of review Maclay requests. The Court 
may not determine what weight should be assigned to the evidence, and it may not make any 



























findings of fact with respect to the record. Instead, the Court may only determine if the 
Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 
In this case, the Commission found evidence in the record that Maclay failed to comply wIth 
various provisions of Idaho Code Title 54, Chapter 20, and Maclay does not argue that the evidence 
the hearing officer relied upon does not support such a finding. Instead, Maclay asks the Court to 
find that the evidence he presented does not support such a finding. However, to the extent that 
evidence in the record supports the Commission's findings, consideration of Maclay's evidence will 
not wanant a reversal. 
If the Court reviews the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support 
a finding that a person did not comply with the law, the COUll will look for evidence of non-
compliance. The Court will not ovellurn the Commission's findings just because there is evidence 
that a person attempted to comply with Idaho law or that the person complied \vith the law 9OC'{ of 
the lime. A good faith attempt to comply is inelevant in determining whether there is evidence that 
a person actually failed to comply with a law. 
1. Idaho Code § 54-2040(5) 
The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2040(5) by using Kucera's 
broker's license after Kucera's death to canyon Kucera's Help-U-Sell brokerage. Maclay does not 
deny that he was not a licensed broker in Idaho during the year following Kucera's death, and he 
does not deny that he continued to use Kucera's Help-U-Sell after Kucera's death. Instead, Maclay 
claims that he was properly using Help-U-Sell's website after Kucera's death because Kucera left 
the business to Maclay and because the transfer of the Help-U-Sell franchise from Kucera to Maclay 
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1 
was in the works. Maclay further claims that he was appointed an interim broker in Washington and 
2 
was appropriately using the Help-U-Sell website in Washington. 
3 A sales agent may not use "another person's broker's license, whether for compensation or 
4 not. to establish or can)' on a business for which a broker's license is required [orJ to manage and 
5 control the office." Idaho Code § 54-2040(5). If a designated broker for a licensed business dies, a 
6 
sales agent may not carryon the business. Idaho Code § 54-2057. Only a qualified individual may 
7 
canyon the business, and only a broker properly licensed in Idaho is qualified to be responsible for 
8 
9 
the activities of a licensed business in Idaho. Idaho Code §§ 54-2016, 54-2057. If a qualified 
10 
mdividual is not appointed within the time required by statute to CatTY on the business after a 
11 broker's death, the business will cease to be licensed. Idaho Code § 54-2057. 
12 Whether Maclay was in the process of obtaining Kucera's Help-U-Sell franchise and 
13 whether Maclay was qualified or permitted to CatTY on Kucera's Help-U-Sell in Washington has no 
14 
bearing on whether Maclay was qualified to canyon Kucera's Help-U-Sell in Idaho. Idaho layv 
15 
requires Maclay to be a licensed broker in Idaho to canyon the responsibilities of a business's work 
16 
in Idaho, and Maclay admits that he was not a licensed broker in Idaho. Because Maclay was nol a 
17 
18 
licensed broker, because a licensed broker was not appointed to can'y on Kucera's Help-U-Sell 
19 business in Idaho, and because the Idaho license for Kucera's Help-U-Sell in Idaho had been 
20 terminated, Maclay lacked the legal right to carryon the business activities of Help-U-Sell in Idaho. 
21 Nevertheless, Maclay used the Help-U-Sell website to advertise Idaho real estate and not all of the 
22 
Idaho Real Estate was listed as FSBO. This evidence supports a finding that Maclay was calTymg 
23 
on Help-U-SeWs business in Idaho in violation of Idaho Code § 54-2040. 
24 
5 




























2. Idaho Code § S4-20S0(1)(a) and (c) 
The hearing officer also found that Maclay violated subsections (a) and (c) of Idaho Code * 
54-2050(1) because the Smith, Wanner, and Jackson seller representation agreements did not 
contain all of the information required by law. Maclay does not deny that these agreements were 
incomplete but instead argues that Runkle was responsible for the omissions. Maclay further 
contends that Runkle never told him to do anything different. 
A seller representation agreement must contain "[c]onspicuous and definite beginning and 
expiration dates" as well as the "[p]rice and terms." Idaho Code § 54-2050(l)(a), (c). Brokers bear 
the ultimate responsibility for making sure seller representation agreements are complete and 
conform to Idaho law, but sales agents who enter into the agreements with sellers on behalf of a 
broker also bear this responsibility. See Idaho Code §§ 54-2002, 54-2038(1), 54-2048, 54-2050. 
Regardless of whether a broker informs a sales agent of the sales agent's statutory 
responsibilities regarding seller representation agreements, Idaho's real estate law informs sales 
agents that they must include certain information in seller representation agreements, and sales 
agents are obligated to follow the law. The evidence indicates that Maclay was appointed the sales 
agent for the Smith agreement and that he voluntarily became the sales agent for the Jackson 
agreement. As the responsible sales agent, Maclay had the responsibility of making sure that the 
seller representation agreements included all of the information required by law. Because there is 
uncontested evidence in the record that the Wanner, Jackson, and Smith agreements were missing 
required information and that Maclay acted as the agent for these sellers, there is sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2050 by not ensuring that the seller 
representation agreements were complete. 














3. Idaho Code § 54-2053(2), (4) 
The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2053(2) by advertising 
listed properties without listing the broker's licensed business name and by using a new brokerage 
name without prior approval by the Commission with respect to Treaty Rock listings on the Help-lJ-
Sell website. In addition, the hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2053(4) 
by providing misleading information with respect to the Treaty Rock listings on the Help-lJ-Scli 
website. Maclay claims that he was posting Treaty Rock listings on his Washington Help-U-Sell 
website, not on an Idaho Help-U-Sell website, and that he used proper "disclosures" which made the 
listings "perfectly acceptable and proper." 
Real estate in Idaho must be advertised through a broker licensed in Idaho or through a sales 














advertisements for Idaho real estate must contain the name of the licensed Idaho broker and must 
not contain information that is misleading to the public, prospective customers, or clients. Idaho 
Code § 54-2053(2), (4). If the Idaho broker changes business names, the new business name "shall 
not be used or shown in advertising unless and until a proper notice of change in the business name 
has been approved by the commission." Idaho Code § 54-2053(2). 
Even if Maclay had an interim broker's license in Washington that allowed him to use Help-
U-Sell in Washington, Maclay did not have a broker's license in Idaho that allowed him to use 
Help-U-Sell to advertise Idaho real estate. After Help-U-Sell's license in Idaho was term1l1ated, 
Maclay obtained a sales agent license under Swanson, the broker at Treaty Rock, and this license 
gave Maclay legal standing to advertise Idaho real estate through Treaty Rock. However, Swanson 
was not affiliated with Help-U-Sell, and the Commission did not authOlize Treaty Rock to become 
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1 
affiliated with or otherwise change its name to Help-U-Sell. As a result, Maclay did not have legal 
2 
standing to advertise Treaty Rock listings on Help-U-Sell's website regardless of whether the Help-
3 U-Sell website was a Washington or an Idaho website. Because there is evidence that Maclay 
4 advertised Treaty Rock listings on Help-U-Sell's website, though there was no affiliation between 
5 the two entities and no official name change, and because there is evidence that Maclay did not 
6 
always include the broker's name, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Maclay 
7 




4. Idaho Code § 54-2054(9) 
11 The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2054(9) by accepting real 
12 estate fees not paid through the broker for the performance of acts requiIing a real estate license. 
13 Maclay does not deny that he accepted up front marketing fees but instead argues that these fees are 
14 
not subject to the Commission's oversight. He contends that "[s]imply posting notice that a 
15 
propelly is for sale-... whether through a sign in the yard, an advertisement in the paper, or a 
16 
description in a multiple listing service-requires no special skill or training and thus IS not 
17 
18 
something that does or should require a real estate license." In support of his position, Maclay relies 
19 on an opinion letter written by Kucera in which Kucera concludes that listing property on an FSBO 
20 website is not an acti vity requiring a real estate license and that a licensee may accept a marketing 
2 fee for such an activity. (Respondent's Ex. A.) 
2 In Idaho, a real estate license is required to sell, list,3 buy, or negotiate or to offer to sell, list, 
23 
buy or negotiate the purchase, sale, option, or exchange of real estate. Idaho Code §§ 54-2003(l)(a), 
24 
25 
.1 Rcal cstate is "listcd" if it is placed "for sale under an agreement with a real-estate agcnt or broker.·' (Black's Ll\V 
26 Dictionary, 8th ed. 2004). 





























54-2004(33), (34). A license is also required to advertise Idaho real estate and to place a sign on 
Idaho real estate. Idaho Code § 54-2053(1). A person who engages in any of these actions engages 
in the business of real estate and must be licensed as a broker or be licensed under a broker as a 
salesperson. Idaho Code § 54-2002. 
However, a person is exempt from this license requirement if the person is taking action to 
sell his own personal property. Idaho Code § 54-2003(l)(a). A property owner may independently 
advertise personal property in a newspaper or on a website without having a license or working 
through a licensed brokerage because the owner is not engaging in the business of real estate. ld. 
Companies that merely provide resources for property owners to create and list their own 
advertisements are also exempt from the license requirement because they are not engaging the 
business of real estate within the meaning of Idaho's real estate law. See Idaho Code ~* 54-2002, 
54-2004(5). These types of companies may publish advertisements in a magazine or on a website 
because they do not act as agents of the property owner or otherwise provide any assistance to the 
owner. For example, an FSBO company is simply a vehicle by which owners independently 
advertise and market their own personal real estate. Such a company does not assign agents to 
listings, and as the name of the company indicates, owners take complete responsibility for the 
advertisements. 
Once a third party becomes involved with the sale of real property by entering into an 
exclusive representation agreement with an owner and taking action on behalf of an owner, the 
exemption from the license requirement no longer applies because the third party is acting as an 
agent or salesperson. A third party who creates an advertisement, lists property in MLS, and places 
a sign in the yard with a third party's phone number is doing more than simply allowing a seller to 





























communicate with others; he is engaging in the business of real estate. See Idaho Code SS 54-2004, 
54-2053. 
If an agent acts on behalf of an owner by engaging in any of the activities listed in S 54-2004 
or S 54-2053, any fees assessed for these activities must be paid to the designated broker, not the 
agent. Idaho Code § 54-2054(9). "All fees must be paid through broker. No sales associate shall 
accept any commission, compensation or fee for the performance of any acts requiring a real estate 
license from any person except the real estate broker with whom the sales associate is licensed." /£1. 
In this case, there is undisputed evidence that Maclay did more than just post advenisements 
of propeny on a website; he acted as an agent by entering into exclusive seller representation 
agreements, posting property on MLS, and placing signs in yards that contained his phone numbcr, 
not the phone numbers of the sellers. There is also undisputed evidence that the flat fees assessed 
for these activities were paid directly to Maclay. Because Maclay's activities were those requiring a 
license and because the fees for these activities were not paid to the broker, the evidence supports a 
finding that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2054. 
5. Idaho Code § 54-2060(2), (3), (11), (12) 
The hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code S 54-2060(2), (3), (11). and (12) 
by engaging in a continued or flagrant course of misrepresentation, by not accounting for or 
remitting money belonging to the brokerage, by dealing dishonestly or dishonorably, and by 
engaging in gross negligence or reckless conduct. Maclay contends that he at all times acted in 
good faith and with an effort to abide by the rules. He accuses the Commission of basing its 
conclusions on perceptions and not the facts, and he claims in his reply that the hearing officer 
abused his discretion by not giving any weight to Maclay's evidence. 



























Pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-2060, the following acts shall constitute misconduct: 
(2) 
(3) 
Engaging in a continued or flagrant course of 
misrepresentation or making of false promises, whether done 
personally or through agents or salespersons ... 
Failure to account for or remit any property, real or personal, 
or moneys coming into the person's possession which belong 
to another ... 
(11) Any other conduct whether of the same or a different character 
than hereinabove specified which constitutes dishonest or 
dishonorable dealings ... 
(12) Gross negligence or reckless conduct in a regulated real estate 
transaction. Conduct is grossly negligent or reckless if, when 
taken as a whole, it is conduct which substantially fails to meet 
the generally accepted standard of care in the practice of real 
estate in Idaho. 
In this case, Maclay's conduct supports a finding that Maclay engaged in a continued or 
flagrant course of misrepresentation. Maclay's continued use of Kucera's Idaho brokerage and 
website, listing Treaty Rock properties on that website after Maclay had been asked to remove the 
listings and also despite the lack of permission from Help-U-Sel\,-+ SUppOt1S a finding that Maclay 
acted dishonestly or dishonorably. Maclay's failure to turn over flat fees to RealTeam for licensed 
work supports a finding that Maclay did not account for or remit money belonging to the brokerage. 
Maclay's preparation of exclusive representation agreements while unlicensed, Maclay's failure to 
ensure that agreements were completely filled out, and Maclay's listing of the Krivor properties in 
MLS while unlicensed supports a finding that Maclay engaged in gross negligence or reckless 
conduct. None of these findings relate to Maclay's primary concern, the nat fee an'angement. 
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6. Idaho Code §§ 54-2065 and 54-2002 
2 Finally, the hearing officer found that Maclay violated Idaho Code §§ 5--1--2065 and 5--1--2002 
3 by acting as a real estate sales agent and posting Idaho properties on Help-U-Sell though Maclay 
4 \\'as not licensed through Help-U-Sell and Help-U-Sell was not a licensed brokerage. Again. 
Maclay claims that he had been working with an individual from Help-U-Sell's corporatc officc and 
6 
that a transfcr of Help-U-Sell from Kucera to Maclay was in the works. 
7 
A person who engages in the business or acts in the capacity of a sales agent in Idaho 
8 
without a license is in violation of Idaho's real estate law and is subject to both civil and criminal 
9 
10 
penalties. Idaho Code §§ 54-2002, 54-2059, 54-2065. The commission may conduct invcstigations 
11 and administrative proceedings, and if it finds that a person acted without a rcquired liccnsc, the 
l2 Commission may impose a civil penalty in an amount not greater than $5,000.00 for a violation of 
13 Idaho Codc § 54-2002. Idaho Code § 54-2059: Stair of IdallO Real Estate COIllIll '/I v. Parkillson. 
14 
100 Idaho 96, 98, 593 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1979). Conversely, the Statc may file a misdemeanor 
15 
charge against a person for acting without a required license, and if the person is found guilty, the 
16 
court may punish that person "by a fine of not to excecd five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by 
17 
18 
imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed one (1) year, or by both." Idaho Code § 54-
19 2065. 
20 The evidence in this case is undisputed that Maclay was advertising Idaho real estate listcd 
21 with Treaty Rock on Help-V-Sell's website after Help-U-Sell's Idaho license and Maclay's Hclp-U-
Scll liccnse had been telminated. Because Maclay was no longer licensed in Idaho through Hclp-D-
23 
Sell and because the law requires him to be licensed through Help-V-Sell in order to advcl1isc Idaho 
24 
25 
4 Although a deal may have been in the works. there is no evidence that a deal had been reached at the time Maclay used 
26 the website. 





























real estate through Help-U-Sell, Maclay's continued use of Help-U-Sell to adve11ise Treaty Rock 
lIstings supports a finding that Maclay violated Idaho Code § 54-2002 by acting without a license. 
This finding provides a basis for the Commission to impose a civil penalty. The Commission did 
not impose criminal penalties. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court affirms the Commission's decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ""-'-'''---_ day of June, 2010. 
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ichael Scott Maclay 
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304 N. Park Road 
pokane Valley, WA 99212 
509) 714-7974 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4th JUOICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Michael Scott Maclay, 
vs 
Case No. CVOC0907296 
Petitioner/Appellant NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Idaho Real Estate CommiSSion, 
Res ondentiRes on dent 
0: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, IDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 
AND YOUR ATTORNEY, KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR AT NA YLOR & HALES, P.C., 
Attorneys at Law, 950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610, Boise, 10 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511, Fax No. (208) 383-9516, AND THE CLERK 0 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 









The above named appellant, Michael Scott Maclay, apPQals against the above-
amed respondent, Idaho Real Estate CommiSSion, to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
he MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER entered in the above-entitled action on 
he 28th day of June, 2010, Honorable Judge, Kathryn A. Sticklen, presiding. 
oticc of Appeal - 1 
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Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and th 
emorandum Decision and Order described in the preceding paragraph 
ppealable order under and pursuant to Rule (11 (a)(2)) or (12(a))] tA.R. 
A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intend 
o assert in the appeal, as attached to this Notice and by this reference incorporate 
erain; provided, however that this list of issues on appeal shall not prevent th 
ppellant from asserting other issues on appeal 
A reporter's transcript of the Hearing on May 18, 2010, is requested at this time, 
nly if the Court grants Appellant's Motion for a Waiver of Fees and Costs, which Motio 
ccompanies this Notice of Appeal. . 
Appellant also requests that the record include all documents automaticall 
ncluded under Rule 28, I. A. R. 
Furthermore, Appellant, Michael Scott Maclay, certifies as follows: 
Appellant is exempt from paying the transcript fee, cost to produce the record, 
nd the filing fee herein because he is indigent as established by motion and affidavit, 
nd the order, previously filed In this case. The previous Order waived the requiremen 
f Appellant paying for the cost of the transcript of the Agency proceeding (Initia 
earing) but not the filing fee, and Appellant simply motions the Court at this time t 
Iso waive the payment of the filing fee for this appeal as well as the cost to produce th 
ourt and/or agency record for this appeal. 
Service has been made upon Respondent pursuant to Rule 20, I. A. R. 





























Respectfully submitted this ~ day of August 2010. 
tate of Washington 





MICHAEL seC) ACiA~ 
APPELLANT/PETITIONER 
ICHAEL SCOTT MACLA V, being sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am the appellant in the above-entitled appeal, and that all statements in 
his notice of appeal, including the attached list of issues for appeal. are true and correct 
o the best of my knowledge and belief. 
MICHAEL SeQ M CLA ,APPELLANT 
ubscribed and Sworn to before me this \...o~ day of August 2010. 
Notary Public 
State of Washington 
KIM 0 KASEY 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
March 06, 2011 
Nota Public, 
State of Washington, County of Spokane 
My Commission Expires: 3/ \.c. I ~ \ 































PRELIMINARY LIST OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Appellant did raise the issue of arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion a 
part of his Petition for Judicial Review, asserting many times over that th 
Respondent and the Administrative Hearing Officer ignored evidence presente 
by Appellant of his Broker's knowledge and tacit encouragement of his marketin 
practices, as well as other evidence presented that Appellant was cooperatin 
with the Agency and was in compliance with Idaho real estate agency la 
following the death of his Idaho Broker. 
2. Appellant further asserts, as an issue on appeal, that the Respondent's action 
are in violation of and in excess of statutory and administrative authority, in tha 
Respondent does not have jurisdiction over marketing fees, and more importantl 
that Appellant's Broker is responsible for his acts and gave approval to the act 
relating to the marketing fees. 
3. Appellant further assets as an issue on appeal that there is no limit on th 
number of broker associations an agent may have so that the listing an 
marketing of properties on web-site showing both Washington and Idaho listing 
and different listing agencies is permitted, thus Appellant was not in violation 0 
any Idaho law in so doing. 
4. The Court's ruling in effect has a chilling, anti-competitive effect on the rea 
estate industry and thus limits Idaho citizens' freedom of choice in deciding he 
to market their real estate for sale. 
5. The punishment does not fit the crime. Examining each individual allegatio 
against Appellant, as separate events, shows how little substance there t 
Respondent's concems. A Broker who signed off on the marketing fees: n 
requirement under Idaho law that marketing fees be paid through the broker, a 
unSigned form or two, a matter of a few weeks of relative inactivity following th 
death of a broker, listing property on a website that had listings for multipl 
agencies in both Washington and Idaho-which conduct is entirely permitte 
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under Idaho law-speak volumes about the relatively harmless nature 0 
Appellant's alleged misconduct, yet Respondent has come down on Appellan 
like he has committed the most despicable of acts. Given the benign nature 0 
Appellant's course of conduct, the revocation of his Idaho real estate license an 
the imposition of a large civil fine and other costs is in gross excess 0 
Respondent's statutory authority. 
ppellant argued these issues to District Court, to no avail, and consequently seeks thi 
ppeal 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
hereby certify that on the ;/ day of August, 2010, 1 caused to be served, by fa 
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aylor and Hales,' P.C. 
SO W Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
olse, 10 83702 
ax: 1-208-383-9516 
ated this ___ day of August 2010. 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MACLAY, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
lDAHO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Respondent. 
Case No. CVOC0907296 
ORDER FOR WAIVER 
OF COSTS ON APPEAL 
Having reviewed the Appellant's Motion for Waiver of Appeal Transcript Fees on 
the above captioned case, and being advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Idaho Code §31-3220, that the costs of 
the fol!owing/::>hall be waived: 
(0/ Filing Fee 
( Clerk's Record 
( Reporter's Transcript 
The cost of the clerk's record shall be paid from the DistIict Court Fund. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ->--_ day of August, 2010. 
Senior Dis~Iict Judge 
ORDER RE: WAIVER OF FEES Page I 
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Idaho, received October 7,2009. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 30th day of September, 2010. 
CERTlFICA TE OF EXHIBITS 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ________________ ~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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